Traceable enterprise risk. Barrier assurance supported by governed records.
Hazards, barriers, controls and effectiveness governed through connected records spanning design and operation.
- 4
- Applications
- 5
- Stages in the flow

Effectiveness derived from governed evidence
Hazards, barriers, controls and effectiveness governed through connected records spanning design and operation.
Effectiveness derived from governed evidence
Barrier effectiveness is derived from governed control findings, such as overdue assurance activities or exceeded survey intervals.
Design and operational assurance kept distinct
Technical safety in design (TSM) and process safety in operation (PSM) are separate applications with their own records.
Field safety records connected to enterprise risk
Permits, incidents and observations from the field sit beside the enterprise risk register.
5 stages, each owned by an application.
Each stage shown here is supported by a Zemerc application, and every application remains independently operable. Operating areas are a way to understand related work, not a mandatory commercial bundle.
1 Hazard. Identified and registered. TSM
Four disciplines, connected through a common control model
Occupational safety, process safety in operation, technical safety in design and enterprise risk are distinct disciplines. Their common concern is the effectiveness of barriers between causes and consequences, supported by evidence that those barriers have been verified.
- Technical safetyProcess safety
Design definitions, barriers, safety-critical elements and performance standards are published as governed requirements for operation.
- Process safetyOccupational safety
Operating envelopes and permits govern frontline work within defined limits
- Enterprise and specialist risk viewsEnterprise risk
Control-effectiveness reporting is aggregated without duplicating the underlying technical registers.
RMS: Risk Management System
One enterprise risk register with facilitated workshops, bow-tie analysis and control-effectiveness records.
Unrated risks remain included in exposure reporting so the visualisation represents the complete risk register rather than only assessed risks.
- Unrated is not lowrisk. A risk without an approved assessment is reported as unrated rather than defaulted to low and remains visible in the register.
- Design effectiveness is separate from operating effectivenessDesign effectiveness and operating effectiveness are recorded separately so weakness in either remains visible.
- A stated limitation rather than an unsupported scoreWhere no approved engineering method exists, the process-safety application reports that limitation rather than producing an index.

Bring one risk and its barriers.
The key question is whether a control has been verified and whether required independence has been maintained between implementation and verification.
- Bow-tie analysis linked to the risk register; RMS draws threats, barriers and consequences from the enterprise risk register.
- Findings derived from governed records; Control findings are derived from the governed control record rather than entered as unsupported conclusions.
- Safety case in design; TSM holds the hazard register, ALARP and safety-critical element assurance.
Every reported figure derived through a governed calculation from recorded source data.
Recordable and lost-time rates are calculated from recorded hours worked. Where the required basis is absent, the application reports that the rate cannot be determined rather than substituting an estimated value.
- Authorised users can report from the field, including offline where supported, with each report receiving a permanent document number.
- Only valid next actions are available for incidents and permits
- Status is not communicated by colour alone

4 applications, each operable on its own.
Adopt one application and it remains independently operable. Adopt several within the area and their records can align where the work genuinely connects.
- HSE
HSE: Health, Safety & Environment Management System
Occupational and operational safety, field reporting, permits and emergencies.
See the interface - PSM
PSM: Process Safety Management System
Operational process safety covering hazards, barriers, change and proof testing.
See the interface - TSM
TSM: Technical Safety Management System
Technical safety in design: safety case, hazard register and safety-critical elements.
See the interface - RMS
RMS: Risk Management System
One enterprise risk register with facilitated workshops, bow-tie analysis and control-effectiveness records.
See the interface

Where this operating area is managed in practice
A degraded barrier record includes compensating measures and restoration actions so impairment remains visible until resolved.
- Mobile incident reporting; HSE supports mobile capture of field reports and incidents.
Before the first working session
Which applications belong here?
RMS, TSM, PSM and HSE.
Does TSM compute SIL or QRA?
No. TSM records hazards, ALARP demonstrations and safety-critical element assurance. It does not claim to calculate SIL or QRA where no approved method is implemented.
Where should I start?
Start with RMS where the enterprise risk register is the primary requirement, or HSE where the immediate need is field reporting and incident management.
Bow-tie analysis linked to the risk register
RMS draws threats, barriers and consequences from the enterprise risk register.
Findings derived from governed records
Control findings are derived from the governed control record rather than entered as unsupported conclusions.
Safety case in design
TSM holds the hazard register, ALARP and safety-critical element assurance.
Mobile incident reporting
HSE supports mobile capture of field reports and incidents.
Bring one risk and its barriers
The demonstration will generate a bow-tie view from the selected risk register.
